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            ____________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________________ 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
 Barbara Sheridan filed this action against her former 
employer, E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., Inc. ("duPont"), and a 
duPont supervisory employee, Jacques Amblard, under Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l et seq.  She 
asserted several different claims for sex discrimination and 
unlawful retaliation.  Before trial, the district court granted 
the defendants' motion in limine to exclude certain evidence. 
During trial, the court dismissed the claims against Amblard on 
the ground that an employee cannot be sued under Title VII.  The 
jury subsequently returned a verdict in favor of Sheridan and 
against duPont on her constructive discharge claim, but the jury 
found for duPont on Sheridan's remaining claims.  The district 
court then granted duPont's motion for judgment as a matter of 
law (and in the alternative for a new trial) on the constructive 
discharge claim. 
 Following the great weight of the federal appellate 
decisions concerning employee liability under Title VII, the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and 
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12111 et seq., 
we affirm the dismissal of the claims against Amblard.  Because 
we are bound by our court's decision in Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 
3 
F.3d 759 (3d Cir. 1994), and subsequent decisions following 
Fuentes, we reverse the entry of judgment as a matter of law on 
the constructive discharge claim against duPont, but we affirm 
the granting of a new trial.  We also hold that the district 
court did not err in its ruling on duPont's motion in limine.   
 
I. 
 Barbara Sheridan began working for duPont in 1979 as a 
part-time waitress in the Hotel duPont.  Sheridan v. E.I. duPont 
de Nemours and Co., No. 93-46 (D. Del. March 28, 1994) ("Sheridan 
I") at 2.  She was subsequently promoted to hostess in the Lobby 
Lounge, group leader in the Lobby Lounge, and captain in the 
Brandywine Room restaurant.  Id. at 2-3.  In May 1989, she was 
transferred to the Green Room restaurant and was promoted to head 
captain of the breakfast and lunch shifts.  In this capacity, she 
reported to Ed Barba, the Green Room restaurant manager.  Barba, 
in turn, reported to Nicholas Waller, who managed all the hotel's 
restaurants.  Id. at 3. 
 Initially, Sheridan received good employment reviews. 
Her 1990 performance review rated her overall performance as 
"very good," which was the second highest possible rating.  App. 
197.  She received the highest possible rating in the categories 
of interpersonal relationships, planning, and problem solving. 
Id.   Her lowest marks, in the categories of oral and written 
communication and attendance, were respectively "good" and 
"satisfactory."  Id.  The review summarized her strengths and 
weaknesses as follows: 
4 
Very good guest relations, organized.  As a 
team player, strengthening is needed to 
improve the overall relationship with the 
rest of the operation. . . .  Since May of 
1989, Barbara's persistence has paid off by 
guest loyalty, staff does not call off sick, 
and overall very good morale from the support 
team.   
App. 198.   
 Sheridan also received several awards and merit 
increases.  In May 1990, she received a $948 yearly merit 
increase.  She also won a $1000 accomplishment award in December 
of that year.  App. 151.  The letter that informed her of this 
award stated: 
[t]he enthusiasm you portray in greeting 
customers and providing them service is 
outstanding . . . .  [Y]ou project an image 
of quality, service and commitment. . . . 
Your success in creating an environment in 
which high quality customer service 
flourishes is evident by the team spirit of 
your staff.  Again, congratulations for this 
well-deserved award and thank you for being a 
role model and a true ambassador for the 
company. 
Id.  While other employees received awards for $200 to $500, 
Sheridan was the only restaurant employee to receive a $1000 
award.  App. 287.  The next month, she was chosen to appear in a 
company video, and in February 1991 she received another merit 
raise of $1188 per year.  App. 733-34, 740-41.    
 DuPont claims that Sheridan's performance began to 
deteriorate in early 1991.  In February 1991, Ed Barba met with 
5 
Sheridan and discussed various corrective measures.  App. 228. 
Two of these measures were maintaining an accurate count sheet to 
insure a fair distribution of "covers" (i.e., tips received from 
the tables) and ending her use of the Green Room bar for grooming 
and smoking.  Id.  Despite this meeting, Barba later saw Sheridan 
putting on makeup and smoking in the Green Room bar.  App. 229, 
305h.   
 According to Nicholas Waller, he met with Sheridan in 
the summer of 1991 to discuss "numerous complaints" about her 
treatment of Green Room employees.  App. 960.  Waller testified 
that employees had complained that Sheridan had asked them to 
perform personal services, such as parking her car, giving her a 
wake-up call, and taking personal mail to the post office.  App. 
963.  These employees allegedly told Waller that those who helped 
her with these personal tasks were favored with more "covers." 
Id.  Sheridan, however, disputed Waller's recollection of this 
meeting.  Sheridan points to Barba's testimony that he was 
unaware of any employee complaints regarding "covers" between 
February and September 1991.  App. 298.  She also observed that, 
despite the alleged complaints, she received another promotion 
and raise on October 1, 1991.  App. 142. 
 During the summer and fall of 1991, the hotel 
streamlined its operating structure.  Sheridan I at 5.  As part 
of this reorganization, the hotel eliminated the managers of the 
individual restaurants and hired a single new manager for all the 
restaurants.  Id.  Sheridan applied for this new position, but 
the hotel selected Jeff Maisel.  Id.  Sheridan felt that she was 
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qualified for this position and that she was not promoted because 
of her sex.  On at least three occasions, she complained about 
this alleged discrimination to Jacques Amblard, the hotel general 
manager.  Id. at 5-6. 
 On October 17, 1991, Maisel met with Sheridan to 
discuss her alleged unfairness in the distribution of "covers," 
her tardiness, and her continued disregard for the hotel's 
grooming policy.  App. 206, 885.  Subsequent to this meeting, 
duPont claims that the following infractions were recorded: 
Oct. 20: Sheridan was 45 minutes late and 
violated grooming policy. 
 
Oct. 22:  Sheridan was 25 minutes late. 
 
Oct. 23:  Sheridan was 20 minutes late. 
 
Nov.  3: Sheridan was 17 minutes late and 
violated grooming policy. 
 
Nov.  3: During a staff meeting, Sheridan 
left premises and was observed with 
another employee in a company van. 
 
Nov. 7. Sheridan was eating and smoking in 
Green Room bar during service 
hours. 
App. 206. 
 Allegedly because of these continued infractions, 
Maisel placed Sheridan on probation on November 10, 1991.  Maisel 
told her that in order to be taken off probation, she would have 
to report to work on time, follow the hotel's grooming and 
smoking policies, and stay in her assigned work area.  App. 207. 
Maisel informed her that further infractions or instances of poor 
performance could result in termination.  App. 208. 
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 Other incidents allegedly took place while Sheridan was 
on probation.  When Joe Marshall, the room and service head 
captain, attended her daily staff meeting one day in February 
1992, Sheridan told him to "leave her meeting,"  App. 219, and 
according to Maisel, who was present, Sheridan was quite rude. 
Id.   Later, Sheridan was asked to work on a Sunday, but she 
initially refused.  When told that she was required to report, 
she agreed but stated that "after 13 years she deserved to work 
Monday-Friday."  App. 220.   
 In late February, the hotel began to investigate 
Sheridan for giving complimentary drinks without ringing up 
complimentary checks, as hotel policy required.  App. 221.  At 
trial, duPont offered evidence that Sheridan had improperly given 
away large quantities of complimentary drinks, as well as food. 
According to a supervisor who participated in the investigation, 
the investigation received "rather consistent feedback from the 
employees of the restaurant" that Sheridan "comped liquor and 
[did] not properly record[] it."  App. 1159.  An internal duPont 
document memorialized alleged statements by numerous co-workers, 
male and female, to the effect that Sheridan "comped" beverages 
and food without recording that this was being done.  App. 222-
226.  The most damaging evidence came from a bartender, James 
Dougherty, who stated that he had kept a daily record of the 
drinks that Sheridan had improperly "comped," and that the total 
for the period from November 1, 1991, to February 18, 1992, was 
$921.75.  Dougherty testified that his dates were "about 98-
percent accurate."   App. 688.  There was evidence, however, that 
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Sheridan was on jury duty or was not scheduled to work on some of 
the days in question.      
 After the investigation was completed, Maisel and 
others met with Charles Beinkampen, the director of hospitality, 
to determine what to do about Sheridan, and they decided to 
reassign her to a non-supervisory position that did not involve 
the handling of cash.  App. 910, 1160.  The hotel offered her the 
positions of front desk representative, health spa attendant, or 
banquet server.  She was offered these positions without a 
reduction in pay.  App. 910.  While the hotel also claimed that 
she would be eligible for promotion and raises in any of these 
positions, Sheridan offered conflicting evidence.  Rather than 
accepting reassignment, Sheridan resigned in April 1992. 
 Sheridan subsequently filed suit against duPont and 
Amblard, asserting three violations of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.  Count I of her 
complaint claimed that the hotel had refused to promote her to 
manager of restaurants because of her sex.  App. 82-83.  Count II 
charged that she had been placed on probation and that other 
disciplinary actions had been taken against her in retaliation 
for her complaints about the hotel's failure to promote her on 
account of her sex.  App. 83.  Count III alleged that the hotel 
had created intolerable working conditions that resulted in her 
constructive discharge.  App. 83-84.  
 The district court denied the defendants' motion for 
summary judgment, holding, among other things, that the evidence 
in the summary judgment record, if believed, was sufficient to 
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show that Sheridan had been constructively discharged.  App. 68-
69.  The court granted in part the defendants' motion in limine 
to exclude certain testimony by Sheridan and two other witnesses. 
The court also ruled that the jury would serve as the finder of 
fact for the claims based on conduct that occurred after November 
21, 1991, the date of the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 
1991, P.L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991), which granted a right 
to a jury trial on Title VII intentional discrimination claims 
for which compensatory or punitive damages are sought.  The court 
ruled that the jury would serve in an advisory capacity for the 
claims based on events that occurred before that date.  Thus, the 
court ruled that the jury would return advisory verdicts with 
respect to Count I (failure to promote) and those alleged 
retaliatory acts (Count II) that occurred before November 21, 
1991.  The court ruled that the jury would serve as the finder of 
fact with respect to the remaining alleged retaliatory acts and 
with respect to Count III (constructive discharge).   During 
trial, the court dismissed the claims against Amblard, holding 
that individual employees are not liable under Title VII.   
 The jury returned special interrogatories.  With 
respect to Count I (failure to promote), the jury found that 
Sheridan was not qualified for the job of manager of restaurants. 
App. 31.  With respect to Count II (retaliation), the jury found 
that the defendants' actions both before and after November 21 
were not taken in retaliation for Sheridan's complaints about the 
defendants' failure to promote her.  App. 32.  However, on Count 
III (constructive discharge), the jury found in favor of Sheridan 
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and awarded her $17,500 in compensatory damages, exclusive of 
lost wages.0  App. 33.  The court adopted as its own the jury's 
findings with respect to the conduct alleged in counts I and II 
that took place before November 21. 
 Both parties then moved for judgment as a matter of law 
or in the alternative for a new trial.  The court granted 
duPont's motion for judgment as a matter of law because it found 
that the evidence was insufficient to allow a reasonable jury to 
conclude that sex played a determinative role in Sheridan's 
constructive discharge.  Sheridan v. E.I. duPont de Nemours and 
Co., No. 93-46 (D. Del. July 14, 1994) ("Sheridan II").  The 
court did not dispute the fact that Sheridan had established a 
prima facie case, and the court stated that it was "willing to 
accept that the jury rejected the defense witnesses' claims that 
the investigation into plaintiff's `comping' activities was 
legitimate."  Sheridan II at 9.  But the court added: "Having 
accepted that proposition . . ., the Court is still left 
searching the record for evidence that gender played a 
determinative role0 in defendant's conduct."  Id. 
                     
0
 
The court calculated Sheridan's lost wages to be $51,072. 
Sheridan v. E.I. duPont de Nemours and Co., No. 93-46 (D. Del. 
May 20, 1994).  However, the jury found that Sheridan had failed 
to mitigate these damages in the amount of $33,000.  The court 
thus awarded her the difference -- $18,072 -- in addition to six 
months of front pay in the amount of $12,768.  Id. at 8. 
0This case was tried prior to our decision in Miller v. CIGNA 
Corp., 47 F.3d 586 (3d Cir. 1995) (in banc), in which we held 
that a plaintiff in an Age Discrimination in Employment Act case 
need show only that age was a determinative cause (as opposed to 
the sole cause) of the challenged action.  Relying on our prior 
decision in Griffiths v. CIGNA, 988 F.2d 457 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 114 S. Ct. 186 (1993), the district court in this case 
11 
 
II. 
 A.  1.  We first consider Sheridan's argument that the 
district court erred in granting duPont's motion for judgment as 
a matter of law.   With respect to this question, we exercise 
plenary review.  Seman v. Coplay Cement Co., 26 F.3d 428, 431 (3d 
Cir. 1994).  "Such a motion should be granted only if, viewing 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and 
giving it the advantage of every fair and reasonable inference, 
there is insufficient evidence from which a jury reasonably could 
find liability."  Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 
1153, 1166 (3d Cir. 1993) (citation omitted).  "Although judgment 
as a matter of law should be granted sparingly, a scintilla of 
evidence is not enough to sustain a verdict of liability.  `The 
question is not whether there is literally no evidence supporting 
the party against whom the motion is directed but whether there 
is evidence upon which the jury could properly find a verdict for 
that party.'"  Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Patzig v. O'Neil, 
577 F.2d 841, 846 (3d Cir. 1978)). 
 2.  We begin by considering duPont's argument that the 
evidence was insufficient to show that Sheridan was 
constructively discharged.  Although the district court did not 
grant judgment as a matter of law on this basis, duPont argues in 
                                                                  
instructed the jury that it had to find that Sheridan's gender 
was the sole cause of her constructive discharge, and the jury 
apparently found that this higher standard had been met.  But in 
granting duPont's motion for judgment as a matter of law the 
district court held that the evidence of sex discrimination was 
insufficient even under the lesser Miller standard. 
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effect that we should affirm the district court on this 
alternative ground. 
 In Goss v. Exxon Office Systems Co., 747 F.2d 885, 887-
88 (3d Cir. 1984), our court recognized the concept of 
"constructive discharge" for Title VII purposes.  As we observed, 
"[c]lassifying a termination as a constructive discharge rather 
than a voluntary quit has significant ramifications with resect 
to the scope of relief."  Id. at 887.  Noting that some courts of 
appeals had apparently "required a finding that the 
discrimination complained of amounted to an intentional course of 
conduct calculated to force the victim's resignation," we 
rejected this approach and adopted "an objective standard" 
requiring a finding that "the employer knowingly permitted 
conditions of discrimination in employment so intolerable that a 
reasonable person subject to them would resign."  Id. at 887-88. 
We have applied this test in subsequent cases.  See, e.g., Clowes 
v. Allegheny Valley Hospital, 991 F.2d 1159 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 114 S. Ct. 441 (1993); Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 
F.2d 1070 (3d Cir. 1992); Levendos v. Stern Entertainment, Inc., 
860 F.2d 1227 (3d Cir. 1988).  We are bound to apply this 
standard here. 
 Applying the Goss test and our subsequent precedents, 
we agree with the district court that there was adequate evidence 
to establish a constructive discharge in this case.  Sheridan 
offered evidence that, when viewed in the light most favorable to 
her, would support a finding that Dougherty's evidence was 
fabricated.  Moreover, Sheridan's situation was aggravated by the 
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fact that most of her staff knew about the investigation and 
might interpret her acceptance of a transfer as an acknowledgment 
of guilt.  Sheridan also presented evidence from which a 
reasonable trier of fact could infer that the new positions 
offered to her would have represented demotions and that she 
would have effectively lost the opportunity for promotion or pay 
raises.  Taken as a whole, the evidence of constructive discharge 
was sufficient. 
 3.  We thus turn to the question whether, as the 
district could held, there was insufficient evidence under St. 
Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993), to show 
that Sheridan's gender was a determinative cause of the 
constructive discharge.  As Sheridan argues, it appears that she 
made out a prima facie case of gender discrimination by showing 
(a) that she is a woman, (b) that she was qualified for the 
position of head captain, (c) that she was constructively 
discharged, and (d) that she was replaced by a man.  See, e.g., 
Waldron v. SL Industries, Inc., 56 F.3d 491, 494 (3d Cir. 1995). 
Under Hicks, Sheridan contends, "[t]hat prima facie showing, 
coupled with the jury's ability to find that the reason offered 
[by duPont] was a pretext, permitted the jury to find that sex 
discrimination had occurred."  Appellant's Br. at 27 (footnote 
omitted).   
 In Hicks, the plaintiff claimed that he had been 
demoted and discharged because of race.  He established a prima 
facie case, the employer offered legitimate reasons for the 
demotion and discharge, and the district court, sitting as the 
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trier of fact, found the employer's reasons to be pretextual. 
Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Center, 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1251 (E.D. 
Mo. 1991).  The court noted, however, that the plaintiff bore the 
ultimate burden of proving that race was a determinative factor. 
Id.  Finding that the plaintiff had failed to prove that the 
employer's conduct was racially rather than personally motivated, 
the court found in favor of the employer.  Id. at 1252. 
 The court of appeals reversed, stating that "[o]nce 
plaintiff proved all of defendants' proffered reasons for the 
adverse employment actions to be pretextual, plaintiff was 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. . . .  No additional 
proof of discrimination is required."  Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor 
Center, 970 F.2d 487, 492-93 (8th Cir. 1992).  Thus, the court of 
appeals directed the district court to enter judgment in favor of 
the plaintiff.  Id. at 493. 
 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine 
whether the factfinder's rejection of the employer's proffered 
reasons mandated a finding for the plaintiff.  Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 
at 2745.  The Court began its analysis with a review of the 
burden-shifting scheme established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).  Under this scheme, the establishment 
of a prima facie case creates a presumption that the employer 
unlawfully discriminated against the employee.  Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 
at 2747.  To overcome this presumption, the employer must 
"`clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible 
evidence,' reasons for its actions which, if believed by the 
trier of fact, would support a finding that unlawful 
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discrimination was not the cause of the employment action."  Id. 
at 2747 (quoting Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 
U.S. 248, 254-55 & n.8 (1981)).  Once the employer satisfies this 
burden, the presumption raised by the prima facie case is 
"rebutted" and "drops from the case."  Id.  
 The Court emphasized that once the presumption was 
rebutted, the plaintiff had to carry the ultimate burden of 
proving intentional discrimination at trial.  The Court wrote: 
It is important to note . . . that although 
the McDonnell Douglas presumption shifts the 
burden of production to the defendant, "[t]he 
ultimate burden of persuading the trier of 
fact that the defendant intentionally 
discriminated against the plaintiff remains 
at all times with the plaintiff."    
 
Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2747 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253). The 
Court continued: 
The defendant's "production" (whatever its 
persuasive effect) having been made, the 
trier of fact proceeds to decide the ultimate 
question: whether plaintiff has proven "that 
the defendant intentionally discriminated 
against [him]" because of his race.  
 
Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2749 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253). The 
Court thus held that rejection of the defendant's proffered 
reasons does not compel judgment for the plaintiff.  Id. 
 Hicks' implications when the defendant moves for 
summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law are less clear. 
Some courts of appeals have held that under Hicks a plaintiff 
will not necessarily survive summary judgment or judgment as a 
matter of law simply because the evidence is sufficient to permit 
a rational factfinder to disbelieve the employer's proffered 
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reasons.  E.g., Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 39 F.3d 537 (5th 
Cir. 1994), reh'g in banc granted, 49 F.3d 127 (5th Cir. 1995); 
Woods v. Friction Materials, Inc., 30 F.3d 255, 260-61 n.3 (1st 
Cir. 1994); Nelson v. Boatmen's Bancshares, Inc., 26 F.3d 796, 
801 (8th Cir. 1994); LeBlanc v. Great American Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 
836, 842-43 (1st Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1398 
(1994).  However, other courts of appeals have disagreed.  E.g., 
Collier v. The Budd Company, 66 F.3d 886, 893 n.11 (7th Cir. 
1995); EEOC v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 44 F.3d 116, 120 (2d Cir. 
1994); Washington v. Garrett, 10 F.3d 1421, 1433 (9th Cir. 1993). 
Cf. Barbour v. Merrill, 48 F.3d 1270, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1995), 
cert. granted on other ground, --- S. Ct. ---, 64 U.S.L.W. 3068 
(1/19/96); id. at 1281 (statement of Williams, J., concurring in 
denial of rehearing in banc). 
 Our court is among those in the latter group.  Relying 
on the statement in Hicks that the "rejection of the defendant's 
proffered reasons, will permit the trier of fact to infer the 
ultimate fact of intentional discrimination,"  113 S. Ct. 2749, 
our court has taken the position that "`if the plaintiff has 
pointed to evidence sufficient[] to discredit the defendant's 
proffered reasons, to survive summary judgment the plaintiff need 
not also come forward with additional evidence of discrimination 
beyond his or her prima facie case.'"  Waldron, 56 F.3d at 495; 
(quoting Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764) (brackets in Waldron).  See 
also Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Refining Corp., --- F.3d ---, 
1995 WL 737890 (3d Cir. Dec. 14, 1995); Sempier v. Johnson & 
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Higgins, 45 F.3d 724, 731 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 
2611 (1995).  We are compelled to follow these precedents here. 
 Although these prior cases concerned motions for 
summary judgment rather than motions for judgment as a matter of 
law, we cannot distinguish them on that basis.  The legal 
standard applied to a motion for summary judgment mirrors that 
applied to a judgment as a matter of law.  Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-51 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).  It would make no sense to 
allow a plaintiff to defeat summary judgment and proceed to trial 
if the plaintiff's evidence could not sustain a judgment in his 
or her favor.   
 In this case, as the district court recognized, a 
rational trier of fact could have found that duPont's proffered 
reasons for the constructive termination were pretextual. We are 
therefore required under our court's precedents to reverse the 
entry of judgment as a matter of law in favor of duPont.  
 B.  While we are bound to follow our court's prior 
interpretation of Hicks and while we acknowledge that that 
interpretation finds support in language in the Hicks opinion,0we 
                     
0Hicks stated:  
 
The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put 
forward by the defendant (particularly if 
disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of 
mendacity) may, together with the elements of 
the prima facie case, suffice to show 
intentional discrimination.  Thus, rejection 
of the defendant's proffered reasons, will 
permit the trier of fact to infer the 
ultimate fact of intentional discrimination,4 
and the Court of Appeals was correct when it 
18 
question whether that interpretation is consistent with two of 
the fundamental principles on which Hicks rests.   
 The first of these is that, under the McDonnell Douglas 
scheme, the ultimate burden of persuasion rests at all times with 
the plaintiff.  See Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2747.  The second is 
that the "presumption" of discrimination that is created when the 
plaintiff makes out the elements of a prima facie case is 
governed by the "bursting bubble" theory.  Under this theory, 
a presumption disappears when sufficient 
counterproof is offered.  The trier may still 
find the presumed fact, but only if the 
natural probative force of the basic facts 
that brought the presumption into play is 
sufficient to support such a finding (or the 
evidence as a whole supports it).  Otherwise, 
the presumed fact may not be found, and the 
presumption does not protect this 
possibility. 
 
                                                                  
noted that, upon such rejection, "[n]o 
additional proof of discrimination is 
required." 
 ____________________________________________ 
  
4.  Contrary to the dissent's confusion-
producing analysis, post, at 2761-2762, there 
is nothing whatever inconsistent between this 
statement and our later statements that (1) 
the plaintiff must show "both that the reason 
was false, and that discrimination was the 
real reason," infra, at 2752, and (2) "it is 
not enough . . . to disbelieve the employer," 
infra, at 2754.  Even though  (as we say 
here) rejection of the defendant's proffered 
reasons is enough at law to sustain a finding 
of discrimination, there must be a finding of 
discrimination. 
 
113 S. Ct. at 2749 & n.4. 
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1 Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal 
Evidence, § 71 at 334 (1994); see also, e.g., 2 McCormick on 
Evidence, § 344 at 462-63 (4th ed. 1992).0 
 From these principles, it seems to follow that once a 
defendant satisfies its production burden and the McDonnell 
Douglas presumption "bursts," a court should no longer accord 
that framework or its elements any special significance but 
should instead focus directly on the central issue in the case --
intentional discrimination.  Thus, in deciding whether a 
defendant is entitled to summary judgment or judgment as a matter 
of law, the court should focus directly on the question whether 
there is sufficient evidence in the record to persuade a 
reasonable factfinder that intentional discrimination on the 
                     
0That Hicks regards the McDonnell Douglas presumption as a 
"bursting bubble" presumption is shown by the following passages: 
 
"If the defendant carries this burden of 
production, the presumption raised by the 
prima facie case is rebutted," Burdine, 450 
U.S. at 255, and "drops from the case," id. 
at 255 n.10. 
 
113 S. Ct. at 2747 (emphasis added). 
 
If . . . the defendant has succeeded in 
carrying its burden of production, the 
McDonnell Douglas framework -- with its 
presumptions and burdens -- is no longer 
relevant. . . .  The presumption, having 
fulfilled its role of forcing the defendant 
to come forward with some response, simply 
drops out of the picture.  [Burdine, 450 
U.S.] at 255. 
 
Id. at 2749 (emphasis added).  See also McKenna v. Pacific Rail 
Service, 32 F.3d 820, 829 (3d Cir. 1994); Gomez v. Allegheny 
Health Services, Inc., 71 F.3d 1079 (3d Cir. 1995). 
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ground alleged by the plaintiff was a determinative cause of the 
challenged employment action.  This approach, which focuses 
directly on the question of intentional discrimination, rather 
than continuing to view the record through the lens of McDonnell 
Douglas, appears to be what the Supreme Court had in mind when it 
said in Hicks that after the defendant satisfies its burden of 
production "the McDonnell Douglas framework -- with its 
presumptions and burdens -- is no longer relevant" and should not 
be "resurrect[ed]."  113 S. Ct. at 2749.   
 Our court, however, has outlined a different approach. 
Instead of recognizing that the McDonnell Douglas framework is 
"no longer relevant" once the defendant has met its production 
burden, our approach continues to accord a special place to a 
central element of that framework -- the defendant's proffered 
explanation.  According to our cases, a plaintiff at this stage 
may defeat a summary judgment motion "by either (i) discrediting 
the proffered reasons, either circumstantially or directly, or 
(ii) adducing evidence, whether circumstantial or direct, that 
discrimination was more likely than not a motivating or 
determinative cause of the adverse employment action."  Fuentes, 
32 F.3d at 764 (emphasis in original).  If the plaintiff relies 
on the first method, our cases require the use of a complicated 
standard for determining whether the plaintiff's reasons have 
been sufficiently discredited.  Under this standard, a plaintiff 
cannot defeat summary judgment "simply by arguing that the 
factfinder need not believe the defendant's proffered legitimate 
explanations," but the plaintiff need not "adduce evidence 
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directly contradicting the defendant's proffered legitimate 
explanations."  Id.  at 764.  "Rather, the non-moving plaintiff 
must demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities, 
inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the 
employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a 
reasonable factfinder could rationally find them `unworthy of 
credence.'"  Id. at 765 (citation omitted).  "[T]he plaintiff 
cannot simply show that the employer's decision was wrong or 
mistaken," but "[o]f course, a decision foolish, imprudent, or 
incompetent by comparison to the employer's usual mode of 
operation can render it implausible, inconsistent, contradictory, 
or weak."  Id. at 765 & n.8.  Moreover, when the employer asserts 
that the challenged action was taken for several reasons, the 
evidence "must allow a factfinder reasonably to infer that each 
of the employer's proffered nondiscriminatory reasons . . . was 
either a post hoc fabrication or otherwise did not actually 
motivate the employment action."  Id.  (citations omitted).  But 
"[i]f the defendant proffers a bagful of legitimate reasons, and 
the plaintiff manages to cast substantial doubt on a fair number 
of them, the plaintiff may not need to discredit the remainder." 
Id. at 764 n.7. 
 Although elaborate, Fuentes' discussion of proof that 
tends to discredit the defendant's reason(s) still does not fully 
capture the relationship between such proof and the plaintiff's 
ultimate burden of establishing intentional discrimination.  As 
we will try to show below, the degree to which evidence 
discrediting an employer's explanation tends to show 
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discrimination on the ground alleged by the plaintiff depends on 
a number of other factors that will vary from case to case. 
Accordingly, we believe that, once the defendant in a McDonnell 
Douglas case has shouldered the production burden, the court, in 
ruling on a defense motion for summary judgment or judgment as a 
matter of law, should inquire directly whether, based on all of 
the evidence in the record when viewed in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff, a reasonable trier of fact could find 
that discrimination on the ground alleged was, more likely than 
not, a determinative cause of the action at issue.  This inquiry 
will require an assessment of four categories of evidence. 
 First, there is the inference of discrimination that 
naturally arises from the elements of the prima facie case.  The 
strength of this inference, however, will vary from case to case. 
In some cases, it will be substantial.  (An example is the 
McDonnell Douglas case itself, in which a black man had engaged 
in a civil rights protest against the employer who denied him a 
position in 1964 in favor of a white applicant.)  In other cases, 
however, the inference of discrimination that naturally arises 
from the elements of the prima facie case will be weak.  (An 
example is the age discrimination case in which one middle-aged 
person is hired, promoted, etc., instead of another somewhat 
older middle-aged person.  See, e.g., Barber v. CSX Distribution 
Services, 68 F.3d 694 (3d Cir. 1995).)  We think that it is clear 
that the inference of discrimination naturally arising from the 
elements of a prima facie case will not always be enough to take 
a plaintiff to trial or to sustain a plaintiff's verdict. 
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 Second, there is the inference of discrimination that 
may often be drawn from the ruling out of the employer's 
proffered reason(s).  The degree to which such an inference is 
justified, however, is inversely proportional to the degree to 
which the record contains evidence of a third possible cause for 
the challenged employment action.  For example, if it is certain 
that an employee was discharged for either reason "a" or reason 
"b" and no other, and if reason "b" can be ruled out, then 
obviously it may be inferred that the real reason for the 
discharge was "a."  But if an employee was discharged for either 
reason "a," reason "b," or reason "c," then ruling out reason "b" 
does not permit an inference that reason "a" was the real reason. 
 Cases in which the record contains strong evidence of a 
third explanation for the challenged action are by no means 
unknown.  See generally Miller v. CIGNA Corp., 47 F.3d 586, 597 
(3d Cir. 1995) (in banc) (trier of fact may conclude that adverse 
employment action "was taken for a reason other than the reasons 
urged by the parties").  Perhaps the clearest of these cases are 
those in which the plaintiff challenges a single adverse 
employment action based on two or more alternative grounds.  For 
example, an employee may claim that he or she did not get a 
promotion (1) because of gender and (2) because of handicap.  If 
the record in such a case contains strong evidence of handicap 
discrimination, rejection of the employer's proffered reason (let 
us say inferior qualifications) will not by itself permit an 
inference that the employer's true reason was gender 
discrimination. 
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 The degree to which a trier of fact can reasonably 
conclude that there was discrimination on the ground claimed by 
the plaintiff also depends upon the degree to which the trier of 
fact can reasonably reject the employer's reason(s).  (It is 
important to bear in mind that acceptance or rejection of an 
employer's reasons need not be an all-or-nothing proposition.) 
The evidence in a particular case may be such as to justify only 
a marginal or partial disbelief or belief of the employer's 
reason(s).  For example, a trier of fact might be justified in 
believing that it is more probable than not (but barely so) that 
the employer's explanation is false.  Or, a trier of fact might 
be justified in believing that it is more probable than not (but 
barely so) that the employer's explanation is true.  In addition, 
a trier of fact might be justified in believing that the reason 
asserted by the employer was not the sole cause but was a partial 
cause (say a 20%, 40%, 60%, or 80% cause) for the challenged 
action.  See, e.g., id.  Or, if the employer asserts multiple 
reasons, the evidence might be such as to justify belief (to some 
degree) of some reasons but not others.  All other things being 
equal, the more strongly and completely the trier of fact can 
rationally rule out the employer's reason(s), the more justified 
it is to conclude that there was discrimination on the ground 
alleged -- and vice versa.   
 Third, disbelief of the employer's proffered reason(s) 
may also give rise to an inference that the employer was trying 
to conceal discrimination on the ground that the plaintiff 
claims.  But the strength of this inference, too, will vary based 
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on the facts.  Its strength will depend on whether there is 
evidence in the record of some other possible explanation that 
the employer might not want to disclose (e.g., in our prior 
hypothetical, handicap discrimination).  In addition, its 
strength will obviously be proportional to the extent and 
strength of the trier of fact's disbelief of the employer's 
reason(s). 
 The fourth category of evidence that may remain after 
the McDonnell Douglas presumption "bursts" consists of any other 
relevant evidence of discrimination on the ground asserted. 
"[S]tray remarks in the workplace" that are insufficient to make  
out a Price Waterhouse case are an example.  See Price Waterhouse 
v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 277 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
 Based on the two fundamental principles noted at the 
outset -- i.e., that the plaintiff always bears the ultimate 
burden of proving intentional discrimination on the ground 
alleged and that the McDonnell Douglas presumption "bursts" -- it 
appears that when the defendant satisfies its production burden 
and the court must decide whether to grant summary judgment or 
judgment as a matter of law for the defendant, the court should 
decide whether in the particular case at hand the evidence in all 
of these four categories taken together could persuade a 
reasonable trier of fact by a preponderance of the evidence that 
discrimination on the ground alleged was a determinative cause of 
the challenged action. 
 If we were free in this case to apply this mode of 
analysis, we would discuss the evidence in some detail.  For 
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present purposes, however, we think that it suffices to say that 
we are inclined to agree with the district court's evaluation of 
the proof.  However, since we are not free to employ this mode of 
analysis, we are required, as previously noted, to reverse the 
entry of judgment as a matter of law in duPont's favor. 
 
III. 
 We must therefore consider whether the district court 
also erred when it granted duPont's motion for a new trial.  Such 
a motion may be granted even if the evidence is legally 
sufficient to support the verdict.  Roebuck v. Drexel University, 
852 F.2d 715, 735 (3d Cir. 1988).  A new trial is appropriate so 
long as the district court could "reasonably conclude[] that a 
miscarriage of justice would occur if the jury's verdict were 
left [to] stand."  Klein v. Hollings, 992 F.2d 1285, 1290 (3d 
Cir. 1993) (quoting Williamson v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 926 
F.2d 1344, 1348 (3d Cir. 1991)) (citing Shanno v. Magee Indus. 
Enters., Inc., 856 F.2d 562, 567 (3d Cir. 1988)).  A trial 
court's decision to grant a new trial based on the weakness of 
the prevailing party's evidence is generally reviewed for an 
abuse of discretion.  Greate Bay Hotel & Casino v. Tose, 34 F.3d 
1227, 1235 (3d Cir. 1994); 9A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice 
and Procedure § 2540 at 378 (1995).  The trial court deserves 
this deference because it is better able to weigh the evidence 
presented at trial.  However, when it is argued that the district 
court's order was based on the application of incorrect legal 
precepts, we exercise plenary review with respect to that 
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contention.  See generally Greate Bay Hotel, 34 F.3d at 1235; 
Rotondo v. Keene Corp., 956 F.2d 436, 438 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 In this case, the district court applied the correct 
legal standard when it granted duPont's motion.  The court 
recognized that "[a] new trial cannot be granted . . . merely 
because the court would have weighed the evidence differently and 
reached a different conclusion."  Sheridan II at 12 (quoting 
Markovich v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 805 F. Supp. 1231, 
1235 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 977 F.2d 568 (3d Cir. 1992)).  Instead, 
the court stated, a new trial may be granted on the ground that 
the verdict was against the weight of the evidence when the 
failure to do so would result in injustice or shock the 
conscience of the court.  Moreover, in assessing the evidence, 
the court recognized that disbelief of duPont's proffered reason 
was evidence of discrimination.  Accordingly, we hold that the 
district court applied the correct legal precepts in ruling on 
duPont's new trial motion, and we therefore review this decision 
for an abuse of discretion. 
 Like the district court, we find little evidence of sex 
discrimination.  Although there is evidence that management may 
have treated Sheridan unfairly, there is scant evidence that this 
was because she was a woman.  Sheridan's testimony that Amblard 
would not address her in the company of her male supervisor and 
that he told her he would watch her like a "hawk" indicates 
little more than personal dislike.  Although a man was promoted 
to manager of restaurants and a man replaced Sheridan as head 
captain of the Green Room, the record indicates that at all 
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relevant times, two of the other four head captain positions at 
the hotel were filled by women.  Sheridan II at 10.  Based on 
this evidence, we cannot find that the district court abused its 
discretion in granting a new trial on the constructive discharge 
claim.0 
 
IV. 
 We next consider whether the district court erred in 
dismissing the claims against Amblard, the hotel general manager, 
on the ground that Title VII does not impose liability on 
individual employees.  App. 847-48.  Title VII states that  
[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice 
for an employer -- 
 
                     
0The dissenting opinion concludes that the district court's new 
trial ruling was tainted by its decision on the motion for 
judgment as a matter of law.  We disagree.  In ruling on the 
motion for a new trial, the district court assumed that its order 
granting judgment as a matter of law would be reversed and, in 
the alternative, still granted the motion for a new trial. 
Sheridan II at 12 & n.11.  We therefore do not agree that the new 
trial decision is undermined by our reversal of the order 
granting judgment as a matter of law. 
 The dissenting opinion also suggests that the district 
court may have failed to apply the complete test in ruling on the 
motion for a new trial.  The dissent apparently is concerned that 
the district judge did not make an explicit finding that allowing 
the verdict to stand would effect a miscarriage of justice. 
Although such a finding would have been helpful for our review, 
the district court did recognize that a motion for a new trial 
should be granted on the ground that the verdict is against the 
weight of the evidence only "`when the failure to do so would 
result in injustice, or would shock the conscience of the 
court.'"  Id. at 12 (citation omitted).  We do not see how this 
statement differs in any material way from the test set forth in 
the dissenting opinion, and we think that a finding that this 
standard had been satisfied was certainly implicit in the court's 
decision to grant the motion for a new trial.  We therefore do 
not agree that the court misapplied the test governing the motion 
for a new trial. 
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 (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to 
discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with 
respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual's race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin . . . . 
 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).  The term "employer" 
 
means a person engaged in an industry 
affecting commerce who has fifteen or more 
employees . . ., and any agent of such a 
person . . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). 
 Sheridan argues that these provisions permitted her to 
assert claims against Amblard.  She notes that § 2000e(b) defines 
the term "employer" to include "any agent" of an employer, and 
she contends that Amblard was an "agent" of duPont.  She also 
observes that under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, a Title VII 
plaintiff may now obtain relief -- compensatory damages -- that a 
defendant such as Amblard is in a position to provide.   See 42 
U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1).  
 Arguments such as Sheridan's have been considered by 
many of the other courts of appeals in cases under Title VII, as 
well as the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") and the 
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), which contain 
definitions of an "employer," 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) and 42 U.S.C. 
§12111(5), that mirror that of Title VII.  Many of these courts 
appear to have completely rejected the concept of employee 
liability.  See, e.g., Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1313-
17 (2d Cir. 1995) (Title VII); Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1399 
(D.C. Cir.) (Title VII), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 569 (1995); 
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Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. AIC Security 
Investigations, LTD., 55 F.3d 1276, 1279-82 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(ADA); Cross v. State of Alabama, 49 F.3d 1490, 1504 (11th Cir. 
1995) (Title VII) (citing Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 
772 (11th Cir. 1991) (Title VII)); Smith v. Lomax, 45 F.3d 402, 
403 n.4 (11th Cir. 1995) (Title VII and ADEA); Grant v. Lone Star 
Co., 21 F.3d 649, 653 (5th Cir.) (Title VII),0 cert. denied, 115 
S. Ct. 574 (1994); Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 
587 (9th Cir. 1993) (Title VII and ADEA), cert. denied, 114 S. 
Ct. 1049 (1994).0 
                     
0An earlier Fifth Circuit case that seemed to reach a contrary 
result, Hamilton v. Rodgers, 791 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1986), has 
been held to be "nonauthoritative."  Harvey v. Blake, 913 F.2d 
226, 228 n.1 (5th Cir. 1990). 
0In addition, the Fourth Circuit has rejected such claims against 
employees based on "personnel decisions of a plainly delegable 
character."  Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d 507, 510-
11 & n.1 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 666 (1994); see 
also Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 104 (4th Cir. 1989) 
(employee may be individually liable for sexual harassment), 
vacated in part on other grounds, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir. 1990) (in 
banc).  The law in the Sixth and Tenth Circuits is less clear.  
For the Sixth Circuit, see, e.g., Jones v. Continental Corp., 789 
F.2d 1225, 1231 (6th Cir. 1986) (statement, in discussion of 
award of attorney's fees, that Title VII claims may be asserted 
against employees); Romain v. Kurek, 772 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 
1985); York v. Tennessee Crushed Stone Ass'n, 684 F.2d 360 (6th 
Cir. 1982); see generally Winston v. Hardee's Food Systems, Inc., 
903 F. Supp. 1151 (W.D. Ky. 1995) (noting absence of controlling 
Sixth Circuit authority, collecting cases, and holding no 
employee liability under Title VII); Johnson v. University 
Surgical Group, 871 F. Supp. 979, 981-86 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (noting 
absence of controlling Sixth Circuit authority, collecting cases, 
and holding employee may be liable under Title VII).  For the 
Tenth Circuit, see, e.g., Ball v. Renner, 54 F.3d 664, 668-69 
(10th Cir. 1995) (holding employee not individually liable at 
least where he or she does not exercise employer-like functions); 
Lankford v. City of Hobart, 27 F.3d 477, 480 (10th Cir. 1994) (no 
employee liability); Brownlee v. Lear Siegler Management Services 
Corp., 15 F.3d 976, 978 (10th Cir.) (dictum that employees may be 
liable under ADEA), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2743 (1994); Sauers 
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 Among other things, the decisions rejecting employee 
liability note that Title VII's definition of an "employer" 
predates the Civil Rights Act of 1991; that before the passage of 
that Act, Title VII did not permit compensatory or punitive 
damages; and that the equitable remedies, including back pay, 
that were then available were directed against the employer.  AIC 
Security Investigations, LTD., 55 F.3d at 1281; Miller, 991 F.2d 
at 587 n.2; Grant, 21 F.3d at 652-53.  From these facts, it has 
been inferred that prior to 1991, an employee could not be sued, 
and it has been noted that Congress did not indicate any desire 
to change this rule when it passed the 1991 Act.  Id.  On the 
contrary, it has been argued that the statutory scheme of the 
1991 Act affirmatively indicates that Congress assumed that 
employees would not be sued under Title VII.  In passing the 1991 
Act, Congress limited damages available based upon the size of 
the defendant.  Under § 1981a(b)(3),  
                                                                  
v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1124-25 (10th Cir. 1993) 
(holding that claim against employee must be deemed to be in 
official capacity).  The First and Eighth Circuits have not yet 
addressed the issue.  See Lenhardt v. Basic Institute of 
Technology, Inc., 55 F.3d 377, 380 (8th Cir. 1995) (not reaching 
issue of employee liability under Title VII, but interpreting 
similar state statute to preclude employee liability); Weeks v. 
State of Maine, 871 F. Supp. 515, 516 (D. Me. 1994) (noting lack 
of First Circuit precedent). Also, numerous district court 
decisions from this circuit have reached the same conclusion and 
found no employee liability, see, e.g., Ascolese v. SEPTA, 902 F. 
Supp. 533 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Clark v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 
885 F. Supp. 694 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Caplan v. Fellheimer Eichen 
Braverman & Kaskey, 882 F. Supp. 1529 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Verde v. 
City of Philadelphia, 862 F. Supp. 1329 (E.D. Pa. 1994), although 
several other courts have reached the opposite result, see, e.g., 
Doe v. William Shapiro, Esq., P.C., 852 F. Supp. 1246 (E.D. Pa. 
1994); Dreisbach v. Cummins Diesel Engines, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 
593 (E.D. Pa. 1994). 
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[t]he sum of the amount of compensatory 
damages awarded . . . shall not exceed . . .  
 
(A) in the case of a respondent who has 
more than 14 and fewer than 101 
employees . . . $50,000; 
 
(B) in the case of a respondent who has 
more than 100 and fewer than 201 
employees . . . $100,000; 
 
(C) in the case of a respondent who has 
more than 200 and fewer than 501 
employees . . . $200,000; and 
 
(D) in the case of a respondent who has 
more than 500 employees . . . $300,000. 
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3).  This section, it has been argued, 
suggests that Congress did not contemplate a respondent who was 
not an employer.  See AIC Security, 55 F.3d. at 1281; Miller, 991 
F.2d at 587 n.2; see also Ascolese v. SEPTA, 902 F. Supp. at 540-
41.  While reasonable arguments in favor of the contrary position 
can be made, see Miller, 991 F.2d at 588-90 (Fletcher, J., 
dissenting); Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1318-24 (Parker, J., dissenting), 
we follow the great weight of authority from other courts of 
appeals and hold that an employee cannot be sued.  We therefore 
affirm the dismissal of Sheridan's claims against Amblard.   
 
V. 
 We next consider whether the district court erred in 
granting in part duPont's motion in limine to preclude certain 
evidence.  Sheridan had sought to introduce testimony by co-
worker Mary Deptula regarding a suggestive remark that was 
allegedly made by Amblard when he saw a woman in a tight dress. 
Deptula would also have testified that one day when she 
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volunteered to park cars, Amblard told her that she could not do 
so because she was a woman.  App. 1520-21.  The district court 
found these statements to be "prejudicial and irrelevant" and 
granted the defendants' motion in limine to exclude testimony 
concerning them under Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 403. App. 
44.   
 We generally review district court rulings concerning 
Rule 403 for an abuse of discretion.  Glass v. Philadelphia 
Electric Co., 34 F.3d 188, 191 (3d Cir. 1994).  However, when the 
district court "failed to explain its grounds for [deciding] a 
Rule 403 [motion] and its reasons for doing so are not otherwise 
apparent from the record, . . . we may undertake to examine the 
record and perform the required balancing ourselves."  United 
States v. Himelwright, 42 F.3d 777, 781 (3d Cir. 1994) (citations 
omitted).  
 In this case, we need not decide the appropriate 
standard of review because we conclude that under either standard 
the district court properly excluded the testimony under Rule 
403.  Amblard's comments had little probative value as to whether 
he had a gender-based animus against Sheridan and whether this 
animus was a determinative factor in any of the actions taken. 
See Hook v. Ernst & Young, 28 F.3d 366, 369, 376 (3d Cir. 1994). 
On the other hand, these comments raise a substantial danger of 
unfair prejudice.  Thus, we hold that the district court properly 
excluded Deptula's testimony under Rule 403.   
 Sheridan also sought to admit testimony by co-worker 
April Akers that Amblard complimented many of the men on the 
34 
staff but never complimented Sheridan or the other women.  App. 
1515; see also Pl.'s Br. at 38-39.  The defendants, however, 
claim that Sheridan never sought to admit this portion of Akers's 
deposition testimony into evidence.  Defs.' Br. at 28 n. 6. 
Sheridan has not provided a record citation showing that she 
attempted to introduce this evidence.  Sheridan's only reference 
is to a court order precluding Akers from testifying as to (1) 
Sheridan's qualifications and job performance and (2) rumors that 
Sheridan was stealing from the hotel.  App. 43.  In this order, 
the court did not address the testimony by Akers that Sheridan 
now seeks to admit.  Thus, we do not believe that Sheridan raised 
this claim at trial, and in any event she has not properly 
presented this argument on appeal.  See Third Circuit Local 
Appellate Rule 28.1(a)(i)(1). 
 
     VI. 
 Sheridan's final two arguments do not require extended 
discussion.  Sheridan contends that defense counsel's use of a 
peremptory challenge based on the age of a member of the venire 
violated equal protection.  For the reasons explained in our 
opinion in Pemberthy v. Beyer, 19 F.3d 857, 870 & n.18 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 439 (1994), we hold that this strike was 
permissible. 
 Sheridan also maintains that defense counsel improperly 
vouched for the credibility of certain witnesses during summation 
and that the district court should have instructed the jury to 
disregard those statements.  However, assuming for the sake of 
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argument that defense counsel's remarks were objectionable, we 
hold that a new trial on Sheridan's denial-of-promotion and 
retaliation claims is not warranted. 
 
VII. 
 For the reasons stated, we reverse the district court's 
entry of judgment in favor of duPont on the constructive 
discharge claim, but we affirm the court's decision to grant 
duPont's motion for a new trial on that claim.  We affirm the 
judgment against Sheridan on her claims against Amblard and her 
denial-of-promotion and retaliation claims.  We also hold that 
the district court properly granted duPont's in limine motion to 
exclude evidence, and we remand this case to the district court 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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Sheridan v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., No. 94-7509 
 
 
SLOVITER, Chief Judge, concurring in the judgment reversing the 
entry of judgment as a matter of law and dissenting from the 
judgment affirming the grant of a new trial. 
 
 
I. 
 Although I join in the majority's conclusion that the 
judgment as a matter of law on Sheridan's constructive discharge 
claim should be reversed, I cannot join in much of its language 
in doing so, particularly its suggestion that this court has 
taken a wrong path in its series of opinions interpreting the 
Supreme Court's opinion in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 
S. Ct. 2742 (1993). 
 In Hicks, the Court was faced with a holding of a court 
of appeals that a factfinder's rejection of the defendant's 
proffered reason for its adverse employment action compels a 
judgment for the plaintiff.  In concluding that it does not, the 
Court also explicitly stated that such a finding permits the 
factfinder to draw the inference that the defendant intentionally 
discriminated against the plaintiff.  Thus, we have read Hicks to 
establish that the disbelief of the defendant's proffered reasons 
is the threshold finding, beyond which the jury is permitted but 
not required to draw the inference of intentional discrimination. 
See 113 S. Ct. at 2749.  In Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 
(3d Cir. 1994), from which the majority seeks to disassociate, we 
stated that a plaintiff survives summary judgment by producing 
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sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of fact as to 
whether the employer's proffered reasons were not its true 
reasons for the challenged employment action.   
 As the majority recognizes, numerous other courts have 
likewise interpreted the Supreme Court's decision in Hicks.  See 
e.g., Barbour v. Merrill, 48 F.3d 1270, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1995) 
("According to Hicks, a plaintiff need only establish a prima 
facie case and introduce evidence sufficient to discredit the 
defendant's proffered nondiscriminatory reasons; at that point, 
the factfinder, if so persuaded, may infer discrimination."), 
petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3068 (U.S. Jul. 3, 1995) 
(No. 95-27); EEOC v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 44 F.3d 116, 120 (2d Cir. 
1994) ("A finding of pretextuality allows a juror to reject a 
defendant's proffered reasons for a challenged employment action 
and thus permits the ultimate inference of discrimination."); 
Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1083 (6th 
Cir. 1994) ("Hicks clarified that the only effect of the 
employer's nondiscriminatory explanation is to convert the 
inference of discrimination based upon the plaintiff's prima 
facie case from a mandatory one which the jury must draw, to a 
permissive one the jury may draw, provided that the jury finds 
the employer's explanation `unworthy' of belief."); Anderson v. 
Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1123-24 (7th Cir. 1994) 
("The Court [in Hicks] explicitly states that the plaintiff may 
prevail in a discrimination case by establishing a prima facie 
case and by showing that the employer's proffered non-
discriminatory reasons for her demotion or discharge are 
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factually false."); Washington v. Garrett, 10 F.3d 1421, 1433 
(9th Cir. 1993) ("[A]s St. Mary's recognizes, the factfinder in a 
Title VII case is entitled to infer discrimination from 
plaintiff's proof of a prima facie case and showing of pretext 
without anything more . . . .").  
 Instead of following this precedent, the majority would 
require, at least in some cases, evidence beyond that 
establishing the prima facie case and supporting the factfinder's 
rejection of the defendant employer's proffered reasons in order 
to find that plaintiff has met his or her burden of showing 
intentional discrimination.  The majority offers no guidance as 
to what specific additional evidence would be required, but 
rather would allow the district court to base its determination 
on its own evaluation of the following four considerations: 1) 
the strength of the inference of discrimination arising from the 
elements of the prima facie case; 2) the degree to which an 
inference of discrimination drawn from the rejection of the 
employer's proffered reasons is justified; 3) the strength of the 
inference "that the employer was trying to conceal 
discrimination," and 4) any other evidence of discrimination on 
the ground asserted.   
 However, the imposition of such an additional 
evidentiary requirement is directly contrary to the Supreme 
Court's statement in Hicks that "rejection of the defendant's 
proffered reasons, will permit the trier of fact to infer the 
ultimate fact of intentional discrimination, and . . . upon such 
rejection, `[n]o additional proof of discrimination is 
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required.'"  113 S. Ct. at 2749 (emphasis in original) (citation 
omitted).  Although the majority sees a conflict between this 
statement and the requirement that the plaintiff must prove 
intentional discrimination, the Court in Hicks believed 
otherwise, stating that "there is nothing whatever inconsistent 
between this statement and our later statements that (1) the 
plaintiff must show 'both that the reason was false, and that 
discrimination was the real reason,' and (2) 'it is not enough  
. . . to disbelieve the employer'."  Id. at 2749 n.4 (citations 
omitted) (emphasis in original).  The Court explained that "even 
though . . . rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons is 
enough at law to sustain a finding of discrimination, there must 
be a finding of discrimination." Id. (emphasis in original).    
 The reasons why the factfinder should be entitled to 
infer intentional discrimination from this evidence appear from 
the relevant caselaw.  We have repeatedly acknowledged the 
difficulty of proving intentional discrimination in Title VII 
cases.  See, e.g., Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 
893, 897 (3d Cir.)(in banc), cert. dismissed, 483 U.S. 1052 
(1987); Dillon v. Coles, 746 F.2d 998, 1003 (3d Cir. 1984). "This 
is true in part because . . . discrimination . . . is often 
subtle."  Chipollini, 814 F.2d at 899.  As the Supreme Court has 
recognized, "[t]here will seldom be `eyewitness' testimony as to 
the employer's mental processes."  United States Postal Serv. Bd. 
of Govs. v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983).  We have tied the 
Supreme Court's establishment of a distinct method of proof in 
employment discrimination cases, that relies on presumptions and 
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shifting burdens of production, to the Court's recognition that 
direct evidence of an employer's motivation will often be 
unavailable or difficult to acquire.  See Chipollini, 814 F.2d at 
897; Dillon, 746 F.2d at 1003. 
 The initial presumption of discrimination arises from 
the plaintiff's prima facie case of discrimination "because we 
presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely 
than not based on the consideration of impermissible factors." 
Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).  I 
assume that the same logic, albeit unarticulated, was the basis 
for the Supreme Court's statement in Hicks that disbelief of the 
employer's reason will permit the factfinder to infer the 
ultimate fact of discrimination, see Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2749, 
even though the presumption "drops from the case" after the 
defendant proffers a legitimate reason.  Texas Dept. of Community 
Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 & n.10 (1981). 
 The fact that the issue arises here in the context of a 
motion for judgment as a matter of law rather than for summary 
judgment should make no difference.  Because a finding of 
intentional discrimination generally depends heavily on 
assessments of the credibility of witnesses and those credibility 
assessments are traditionally left to the jury, it follows that 
the jury must be permitted to draw the inference of intentional 
discrimination from its negative credibility finding.  See Barber 
v. CSX Distribution Servs., 68 F.3d 694, 700 (3d Cir. 1995) 
("Evaluation of witness credibility is the exclusive function of 
the jury, and where the only evidence of intent is oral 
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testimony, a jury could always choose to discredit it." (quoting 
Bhaya v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 832 F.2d 258, 262 (3d Cir. 
1987))).  See also Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716 ("It is true that it 
is very difficult to prove what the state of a man's mind at a 
particular time is, but if it can be ascertained it is as much a 
fact as anything else." (quoting Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, 29 Ch. 
Div. 459, 483 (1885))); Chipollini, 814 F.2d at 899 ("The issue 
of the defendant's intent at the time of the plaintiff's 
discharge is clearly a factual question.").   
 The majority seems to believe that this court's focus 
on the credibility of the defendant's proffered explanation 
impermissibly gives continuing weight to the presumption of 
discrimination created by the prima facie case even after the 
McDonnell-Douglas presumption "bursts."  However, I see nothing 
that undermines the "bursting" of the presumption.  The 
McDonnell-Douglas prima facie case is used only to move the 
plaintiff's case past the pleadings stage.  Once defendant has 
satisfied its burden under Burdine to articulate a 
nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision, and 
plaintiff has cast doubt on that reason, the case then moves from 
the summary judgment stage to the factfinder.  It is at that 
stage that the credibility of the defendant's proffered 
explanation may play a significant - even a determinative - role. 
 As the Court stated in Hicks, "[t]he factfinder's 
disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant 
(particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of 
mendacity) may, together with the elements of the prima facie 
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case, suffice to show intentional discrimination."  113 S. Ct. at 
2749.  Fuentes and our later cases have reasonably concluded from 
this statement that a plaintiff who has made out a prima facie 
case may defeat an adverse judgment by the court by producing 
evidence from which a factfinder might discredit the defendant's 
proffered reasons.   
 The majority is mistaken in its view that basing a 
finding of intentional discrimination on the jury's rejection of 
the employer's explanation together with the facts supporting the 
prima facie case is inconsistent with the bursting of the 
presumption.  In Burdine itself, the Supreme Court made clear 
that "[i]n saying that the presumption drops from the case, we do 
not imply that the trier of fact no longer may consider evidence 
previously introduced by the plaintiff to establish a prima facie 
case. . . . [T]his evidence and inferences properly drawn 
therefrom may be considered by the trier of fact on the issue of 
whether the defendant's explanation is pretextual."  Burdine, 450 
U.S. at 255 n.10.   
 Much of the majority's discussion is predicated on its 
concern that an employer may proffer a false reason for its 
actions, not to conceal the discrimination alleged but rather to 
conceal a different form of discrimination or some other unlawful 
conduct.  The courts should not base their decisions on such a 
hypothesis.  We routinely expect a party to give honest testimony 
in a court of law; there is no reason to expect less of a 
defendant charged with unlawful discrimination.  If a defendant 
fails to come forward with the true and credible explanation, 
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there is no policy to be served by refusing to permit the jury to 
infer that the real motivation is the one that the plaintiff has 
charged. 
 In sum, I continue to believe that this court's 
interpretation of Hicks, as stated in Fuentes, Waldron v. SL 
Indus., Inc., 56 F.3d 491 (3d Cir. 1995), Sempier v. Johnson & 
Higgins, 45 F.3d 724 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2611 
(1995), and most recently in Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Ref. 
Corp., No. 95-3101, 1995 WL 737890 (3d Cir. Dec. 19, 1995), is 
true to the language and holding of Hicks and the principles upon 
which it rests.   
 This does not mean that the courts in discrimination 
cases lose their traditional obligation to review the sufficiency 
of the showing on which summary judgment may be based or, if the 
issue is judgment as a matter of law, the adequacy of the showing 
plaintiff made to the factfinder.  In both such instances, the 
district court must determine whether the plaintiff has cast 
sufficient doubt upon the employer's proffered reasons to permit 
a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the reasons are 
incredible.  See, e.g., Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764-765; Ezold v. 
Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 523, 531, 533 
(3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 88 (1993).  But once the 
court is satisfied that the evidence meets this threshold 
requirement, it may not pretermit the jury's ability to draw 
inferences from the testimony, including the inference of 
intentional discrimination drawn from an unbelievable reason 
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proffered by the employer.  For these reasons, I agree that the 
judgment for duPont as a matter of law must be reversed.0  
II.   
 However, I respectfully disagree that we should affirm 
the order granting a new trial and instead would remand so that 
the district court can reconsider that issue.  The district 
court's explanation for its grant of a new trial was brief, 
inasmuch as its ruling focused primarily on its decision to grant 
defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law.  The court 
noted in a footnote that it was obliged under Rule 50(c) to make 
a conditional ruling on the defendant's motion for a new trial. 
To comply with that requirement, the court stated merely that it 
"would grant the motion for a new trial because the jury's 
verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence."  D. Ct. 
Opinion at 12 n.11. 
 The majority would affirm the grant of a new trial, 
noting that the court "applied the correct legal precepts." 
Majority Opinion at 28.  I am less confident than the majority 
that this is so.  If the majority is suggesting that the district 
                     
0As to the dismissal of the claims against Amblard on the ground 
that Title VII does not impose personal liability on individual 
employees, although I find the reasoning of Judge Fletcher and 
Judge Parker convincing, see Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l Inc., 991 
F.2d 583, 588-90 (9th Cir. 1993) (Fletcher, J., dissenting); 
Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1318-24 (2d Cir. 1995) 
(Parker, J., dissenting), the majority correctly notes that the 
great weight of authority from other courts of appeals is 
otherwise, and I see no purpose to dissent from the court's 
judgment on this issue. 
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court made no error of law in its post-trial rulings, this 
statement would be inconsistent with our ruling that the district 
court made a substantial error of law in its understanding of the 
quantum of evidence that is needed to uphold a jury's verdict. 
The district court based its grant of judgment as a matter of law 
on its understanding that "[i]n order to demonstrate that gender 
was a motivating factor, plaintiff would have to point to some 
evidence that that was the motive of those in the decision-making 
process.  No such evidence exists in the record."  D. Ct. Opinion 
at 11-12.  This substantial legal error is the basis for our 
decision today to reverse the district court's grant of judgment 
as a matter of law.   
 The district court was clearly operating under the 
misconception that direct evidence of discriminatory intent was 
necessary to sustain the jury's verdict.  It seems likely that 
the court's conclusion that specific evidence of gender 
discrimination was necessary led ineluctably to its conditional 
new trial ruling.  However, because such evidence is not a 
prerequisite to a finding of discrimination, I believe the 
district court should be given the opportunity to reconsider 
whether a new trial is warranted in light of the correct legal 
principles. 
 I believe it is also unclear whether the district court 
applied the complete test for ruling on a new trial motion.  In 
granting that motion, the district court merely concluded that 
the jury's verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence.  I 
recognize that a new trial may be granted even if the evidence is 
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legally sufficient to support the verdict.  Roebuck v. Drexel 
Univ., 852 F.2d 715, 735 (3d Cir. 1988).  However, we have 
cautioned that a district court should grant a new trial on the 
basis that the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence 
"only where a miscarriage of justice would result if the verdict 
were to stand."  Williamson v. Consol. Rail Corp., 926 F.2d 1344, 
1352 (3d Cir. 1991).  We have explained that this stringent 
standard is necessary to ensure that a district court "does not 
substitute its `judgment of the facts and the credibility of the 
witnesses for that of the jury.'"  Fineman v. Armstrong World 
Indus., Inc., 980 F.2d 171, 211 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Lind v. 
Schenley Indus. Inc., 278 F.2d 79, 90 (3d Cir. 1960)), cert. 
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1285 (1993).  "Such an action effects a 
denigration of the jury system and to the extent that new trials 
are granted the judge takes over, if he does not usurp, the prime 
function of the jury as the trier of facts."  Id. 
 Therefore, before imposing on Sheridan the burden and 
expense of a new trial, I would remand to require the district 
court to determine whether, inasmuch as Sheridan was not obliged 
to produce direct evidence of discriminatory intent, the jury's 
verdict for Sheridan was against the great weight of the evidence 
and would effect a miscarriage of justice.  
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